This book will interest scholars and practitioners in economics, finance, accounting and law; all areas in which the Lehman bankruptcy has been a major controversy. It will also appeal to a broad audience who care about the causes of the financial crisis and the role of the Federal Reserve's leaders.

The bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers was the pivotal event of the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed. Ever since the bankruptcy, there has been heated debate about why the Federal Reserve did not rescue Lehman in the same way it rescued other financial institutions, such as Bear Stearns and AIG. The Fed's leaders from that time, especially former Chairman Ben Bernanke, have strongly asserted that they lacked the legal authority to save Lehman because it did not have adequate collateral for the loan it needed to survive. Based on a meticulous four-year study of the Lehman case, The Fed and Lehman Brothers debunks the official narrative of the crisis. It shows that in reality, the Fed could have rescued Lehman but officials chose not to because of political pressures and because they underestimated the damage that the bankruptcy would do to the economy. The compelling story of the Lehman collapse will interest anyone who cares about what caused the financial crisis, whether the leaders of the Federal Reserve have given accurate accounts of their actions, and how the Fed can prevent future financial disasters.

Advance praise: 'The official narrative of any crisis is not always the most accurate. Professor Laurence M. Ball's authoritative account of Lehman's demise debunks the Fed's narrative of the calamity and raises uncomfortable questions about the Fed's inconsistent use of its discretionary authority. This captivating book should be required reading for anyone with a stake in preventing the next financial collapse.' Athanasios Orphanides, Professor of the Practice of Global Economics and Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology